DEFINITION

This internal referendum proposes a transition to quadratic voting for the evaluation of the voting policy for the HQ account. This account currently has a total delegation ranging between 223K DOT (Root) and 313K DOT (Wish for Change).

The outcome of this account’s votes is currently calculated on a one-member-one-vote basis, in line with the current voting policy. This approach disincentivizes higher delegations to the DAO. Members who delegate with higher conviction should naturally have higher influence on this account, while we should also have a mechanism that mitigates the whale domination effect, which we have experienced first-hand on Polkadot. Quadratic voting offers a relatively fair solution by defining voting power as the square root of an account’s total delegated conviction.

Please see the example scenario below:

- Member 1:  300 DOT @ 3x =  900 DOT ->  √(900) = 30.0 DOT
- Member 2:  100 DOT @ 6x =  600 DOT ->  √(600) = 24.5 DOT
- Member 3:  650 DOT @ 6x = 3900 DOT -> √(3900) = 62.4 DOT
- Member 4:  220 DOT @ 4x =  880 DOT ->  √(880) = 29.7 DOT
- Member 5: 1400 DOT @ 4x = 5600 DOT -> √(5600) = 74.8 DOT

This results in a total voting power of 221.4 DOT. Instead of an equal 20% distribution, the new voting power percentages under quadratic voting become:

- Member 1: 14%
- Member 2: 11%
- Member 3: 28%
- Member 4: 13%
- Member 5: 34%

After applying quadratic voting to determine voting power, the outcome of each referendum will still be calculated according to the current policy (e.g. ≥60% quorum required for Big Spender).

UNDELEGATION/REDELEGATION

Removal of delegation by a member results in the removal of their voting power. When a member delegates again, or a new member delegates for the first time, it will take 10 calendar days for their voting power to reach its full value. The increase is linear, directly proportional to the time elapsed.

TERMS

1. This transition to quadratic voting does not apply to the DV delegation, which remains one-core-member-one-vote, with no changes to the current policy. However, removal of delegation to the DAO also removes the member’s voting power from DV vote evaluations.
2. If approved by the members, this policy will take effect immediately upon the conclusion of the referendum. Any votes affected by the policy change will be resubmitted.
3. The approval of this policy change may cause the votes of HQ and DV accounts to differ on some referenda. In my opinion, this outcome should be welcomed as a positive manifestation of the experimental nature of our policies.

Kind Regards,
kukabi | Helikon