I see absolutely no value in this kind of gigaproposals, this will not only make measuring the success of such a campaign practically impossible, it also leaves no room to vote on any of the campaigns individually on their own merits as it's a blanket AYE or NAY. In the upcoming days, I'll try to organize my thoughts in this discussion section on each of the individual campaigns that make up this gigaproposal.

The first thing I'd like to write about is the closing statement of the proposal, so in a way I'm starting at the end and will circle around and talk about the individual campaigns.

We believe this proposal doesn’t just solve a problem—it defines how they should be solved and how problems should be approached in OpenGov: with coordination, strategy, and unity. It positions the hive mind as a unified front, making it more effective, sustainable and suitable to address global corporations and bug institutions. This is OpenGov 2.0.

In my opinion, this is absolutely the wrong direction for OpenGov, I believe that this kind of treasury spending and marketing campaign should be put into action by first putting the long-term strategy to a vote with a preliminary action plan, all of which can then be put individually into proposals with individual proposals to be judged their own merit.

These grandiose gigaproposals will only result in overwhelmingly one-sided sentiment in the community due to everything conveniently packaged into one big box and put forward to the community as some kind of master plan when in reality it doesn't seem to be anything more than a bunch of loosely related marketing campaigns.

There's a few issues I see with this proposal:

1. The Treasury is bearing all of the execution risk in this proposal, because the payment is upfront and quite large. The ideas here and ability to execute on them are unproven, and while they could potentially be good, the execution should be proven out in successive stages - e.g. similar to how a business goes from idea stage to product-market fit to growth.
2. There needs to be skin in the game for all participants, for a venture like this. Success here requires product-market fit for the product that's being developed, in order to avoid a "build it and they will come" mentality. That has more aspects of a business than a common good venture, so I wonder if a business is a better structure here. Skin in the game for the execution team might be sweat equity where they demonstrate initial traction / proof points, and skin in the game for the esports organizations could be co-investment, which would indicate they strongly believe the idea will have a return for them. The ideal might be that the product(s) proposed here are good enough that the esports organizations adopt them without needing to pay an IP fee, and they contibute their own IP because it serves their own self interest.
3. The incentives are not aligned regarding the incentive payments. If there are commissions or rewards, they should be paid based on success and impact generated from the proposal. Upfront commissions may make sense to bring established businesses (e.g. already with blockchain users or transactions) to Polkadot, but large upfront commisions for idea stage proposals seem to be just rewarding the ability for someone to imagine and write a large proposal, without checks on execution.
4. Given the size of the ask, there is naturally an opportunity cost to consider. In the same conversation, we should consider focusing direct funds on developers and builders (e.g. rather than "IP" or retail). Hopefully this kickstarts the conversation around that.