[INT] PDAO #10 - Transition to Quadratic Voting for HQ Account
closed
Description

DEFINITION

This internal referendum proposes a transition to quadratic voting for the evaluation of the voting policy for the HQ account. This account currently has a total delegation ranging between 223K DOT (Root) and 313K DOT (Wish for Change).

The outcome of this account’s votes is currently calculated on a one-member-one-vote basis, in line with the current voting policy. This approach disincentivizes higher delegations to the DAO. Members who delegate with higher conviction should naturally have higher influence on this account, while we should also have a mechanism that mitigates the whale domination effect, which we have experienced first-hand on Polkadot. Quadratic voting offers a relatively fair solution by defining voting power as the square root of an account’s total delegated conviction.

Please see the example scenario below:

- Member 1:  300 DOT @ 3x =  900 DOT ->  √(900) = 30.0 DOT
- Member 2:  100 DOT @ 6x =  600 DOT ->  √(600) = 24.5 DOT
- Member 3:  650 DOT @ 6x = 3900 DOT -> √(3900) = 62.4 DOT
- Member 4:  220 DOT @ 4x =  880 DOT ->  √(880) = 29.7 DOT
- Member 5: 1400 DOT @ 4x = 5600 DOT -> √(5600) = 74.8 DOT

This results in a total voting power of 221.4 DOT. Instead of an equal 20% distribution, the new voting power percentages under quadratic voting become:

- Member 1: 14%
- Member 2: 11%
- Member 3: 28%
- Member 4: 13%
- Member 5: 34%

After applying quadratic voting to determine voting power, the outcome of each referendum will still be calculated according to the current policy (e.g. ≥60% quorum required for Big Spender).

UNDELEGATION/REDELEGATION

Removal of delegation by a member results in the removal of their voting power. When a member delegates again, or a new member delegates for the first time, it will take 10 calendar days for their voting power to reach its full value. The increase is linear, directly proportional to the time elapsed.

TERMS

  1. This transition to quadratic voting does not apply to the DV delegation, which remains one-core-member-one-vote, with no changes to the current policy. However, removal of delegation to the DAO also removes the member’s voting power from DV vote evaluations.
  2. If approved by the members, this policy will take effect immediately upon the conclusion of the referendum. Any votes affected by the policy change will be resubmitted.
  3. The approval of this policy change may cause the votes of HQ and DV accounts to differ on some referenda. In my opinion, this outcome should be welcomed as a positive manifestation of the experimental nature of our policies.

Kind Regards,
kukabi | Helikon

Appendants
1
#1
12d ago

This proposal does not apply to the Permanence DAO internal referenda, which will also remain one-core-member-one-vote.

Optionssingle

Votes·7

15fT...yBzL
15fT...yBzL
15fTH34bbKGMUjF1bLmTqxPYgpg481imThwhWcQfCyktyBzL
Aye
# 1
1ZSP...vx6w
1ZSP...vx6w
1ZSPR3zNg5Po3obkhXTPR95DepNBzBZ3CyomHXGHK9Uvx6w
Abstain
# 3
I'm supportive if the larger delegates to the dao would like this to happen. And I believe it's a good experiment. I think there are many factors that reflect whether or not someone may delegate more vs. less, so it's difficult to judge whether or not this is a key factor.
12s6...nE8h
12s6...nE8h
12s6UMSSfE2bNxtYrJc6eeuZ7UxQnRpUzaAh1gPQrGNFnE8h
Aye
# 1
167Y...TY9F
167Y...TY9F
167YoKNriVtP4Nxk9F9GRV7HTKu5VnxaRq1pKMANAnmmTY9F
Aye
# 1
Clear Aye
1xzc...1bX6
1xzc...1bX6
1xzcLSwo7xBFkJYZiL4EHaqFpuPTkH641E3V43W4cuk1bX6
Abstain
# 3
12Kt...DCoJ
12Kt...DCoJ
12KtA8mtfsK1CyQb4utLiwG3ao22z77w2cM2GqnaL2RiDCoJ
Abstain
# 3
Would like to hear from the members with the lowest amount delegated to ensure this change won't impact their motivation to participate.
14gM...deVb
14gM...deVb
14gMJV95zwxUsFEZDSC8mtBVifS6SypKJkfBKANkMsLZdeVb
Aye
# 1
Worth a try though I think it's different with use cases in public goods funding like gitcoin. My main concern it may hurt some members' motivations to vote.

Discussions·0

No current comments
Information
Snapshot
Members
11
Timestamp
Created
Jun 08 2025 11:14
Start date
Jun 07 2025 21:00
End date
Jun 14 2025 21:00
Results
Voters
7
one-person-one-vote
Aye
4 VOTE
 
Nay
0 VOTE
 
Abstain
3 VOTE
 
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